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The Accession of the Soviet Union to GATT
Kevin C. KENNEDY*
On August 15, 1986, the Soviet Union formally applied for permission to
participate in the eighth and latest round of international trade negotiations being
conducted under the auspices of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
("GATT").1 The agenda of these trade talks-to be known as the "Uruguay
Round" 2-- will be wide-ranging and will include negotiations on agricultural export
subsidies, foreign investment, intellectual property rights, and trade in services.I The
talks, which will be held in Geneva, are expected to last up to four years.4 The Soviet
Union initially requested observer status, 5 with full membership in GATT following
"in due course." 6 To no one's great surprise, the Soviet Union's request was rejected.7
The United States officially opposed the Soviet application, ostensibly because of
the nonmarket orientation of the Soviet economy,8 a view shared by many Western
nations. 9 GATT principles, of course, are premised on the existence of national
*Assistant Professor of Law, St. Thomas University School ofLaw, Miami, Florida. J.D. 1977, Wayne State
University School of Law; LL.M. 1982, Harvard Law School.
1 3 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 1077 (1986). This was not the first time the Soviet Union has made overtures to
GATT. In 1982 it sought observer status at the GATT ministerial meeting, and later sought observer status at the
GATT Council. See Patterson, Improving GA TT Rules for Nonmarket Economies, 20J. W.T. L. No. 2, p. 1 8 5 (1986)
[hereinafter Patterson].
2 3 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 1122 (1986); N.Y. Times, Sept. 21, 1986, at 11, col. 1. See also Hufbauer, Does
Anyone Really Want Free Trade? N.Y. Times, Sept. 14,1986, at F3, col. 1. Thetrade talks werealso dubbed (tongue
in cheek) the cafe-au-lait round after a Columbian-Swiss draft agenda. The Economist, Aug. 2, 1986, at 52, col. 2.
See GA TT Launches Uruguay Round As Consensus Reached on Services, Agricultural Trade, 3 Int'l Trade Rep.
(BNA) 1150 (1986); The Economist, Sept. 13, 1986, at 63-69; N.Y. Times, Sept. 21, 1986, at 1, col. 6; 11, col. 1.
For an excellent background discussion of the latest round of trade negotiations, see G. Hufbauer & J. Schott,
Trading for Growth: The Next Round of Trade Negotiations (Institute for International Economics Monograph
No. 11, 1985). See generally Trade Policies for A Better Future, Proposals for Action (GATT Monograph 1985).
1 3 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 1182 (1986); N.Y. Times, Sept. 21, 1986, at 1, col. 6.
5 3 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 1077 (1986); Christian Science Monitor, Aug. 28, 1986, at 21, col. 4. Observer
status at GATT "sometimes leads to full GATT membership."J. Jackson, World Trade and the Law of GATT364
(1969) (footnote omitted).
6 3 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 1077 (1986); 3 Int'l Trade Rep. 1098 (BNA) 1098 (1986).
1 See 3 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 1150, 1151 (1986) ("Consensus was not reached on the Soviet Union's possible
participation in the Uruguay Round as an observer. However, it was agreed that the Soviets will be kept informed
on the progress of negotiations ... '"); The Economist, Sept. 27, 1986, at 74, col. 1; Christian Science Monitor,
Sept. 24, 1986, at 15, col. 2.
8 3 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 1077 (1986); Christian Science Monitor, Aug. 28, 1986, at 21, col. 4. At least four
basic differences have been identified to distinguish nonmarket from market economies. Nonmarket economies
are guided by a national economic plan for resource allocation, and are further characterized by centrally-planned
levels of imports and exports, fixed prices without consideration of supply and demand, and nonconvertible
currencies. See K. Dam, The GATT-Law and International Economic Organization 318 (1970).
For a discussion ofU. S. treatment ofnonmarket economy countries vis-a-vis GATT, see Lansing & Rose, The
Granting and Suspension of Most-Favored-Nation Status for Nonmarket Economy States: Policy and Consequences, 25
Harv. Int'l L.J. 329 (1984) [hereinafter Lansing & Rose].
3 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 1077 (1986).
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economies which are decentralized. 10 Thus, given the centrally planned nature of the
Soviet economy, the reservations of the West are sound. I' Regrettably, however, the
official U.S. reservation to Soviet accession to GATT may lack candor when read
against other statements by the White House that the Soviets want to use GATT for
political purposes. 12 The same charge could be made against U.S. opposition to
Soviet GATT accession.
The respective positions of the Soviet Union and the United States on this issue
are ironic. At the time GATT was first being discussed at the end of World War II, the
United States favored Soviet accession to GATT.13 The Soviet Union, on the other
hand, absented itself from GATT discussions, believing that the United States was
bent on world economic and political hegemony.14
Notwithstanding the West's opposition to Soviet accession to GATT, four
Socialist countries have become GATT contracting parties-Poland, Hungary,
Yugoslavia and Romania. Of these four, Romania, Poland and Hungary have non-
market economies. 5 Of equal significance, the Soviet Union is now the world's sixth
largest exporter of merchandise trade after the United States, West Germany, Japan,
the United Kingdom, and France.1 6 It ranks seventh in imports of merchandise
trade.' 7 In 1983, 39 per cent of the Soviet Union's exports of merchandise trade was
destined for the West. 18 In short, the Soviet Union is a major player in international
trade, especially with the West. 19 Knowing that a country's influence in GATT is in
direct proportion to its importance in international trade, the West undoubtedly
realizes the not insignificant influence the Soviet Union would have in GATT if
admitted to membership. But this realization is hardly a reason for opposing Soviet
10 J. Jackson, World Trade and the Law of GATT329-32 (1969) [hereinafter Jackson]; F. Roessler, The Scope,
Limits and Function of the GA TT Legal System 12 (GATT Working Paper undated).
1 In dealing with the phenomenon ofstate trading-when the government acts as a principal in trade rather
than merely establishing the rules for conducting such trade-the GATT requires that state trading enterprises
conduct their trade on the basis of "commercial considerations only." General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade,
Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. pts. 5, 6, T.I.A.S. No, 1700, 55 U.N.T.S. 194, art. XVII(1)(b) [hereinafter GATT]. See
Jackson, supra note 10, at 329-61; lanni, The International Treatment of State Trading, 16J. World Trade L. 480(1982);
Baban, State Trading and the GATT, 11 J. World Trade L. 334 (1977).
IS See Christian Science Monitor, Sept. 15, 1986, at 9, col. 2.
13 M. Kostecki, East-West Trade and the GATT System 2 (1979) [hereinafter Kosteckil.
14 Id. at 3.
15 See World Development Report 197 (World Bank 1985) (Romania, Poland, Hungary listed as nonmarket
economy countries) [hereinafter World Development Report]; J. Jackson & W. Davey, Legal Problems of Inter-
national Economic Relations 1183 (1986) (Yugoslavia "has a sufficiently market-oriented economy that its member-
ship was not thought to raise the problems encountered when the other East European countries applied for
membership").
11 Christian Science Monitor, Sept. 15, 1986, at 20. In 1984, the "Soviet Union exported over $91 billion in
merchandise trade and imported over $80 billion in such trade. World Development Report, supra note 15, at 197.
This compares with the $216 billion worth of exports and the $338 billion worth of imports in merchandise trade
for the United States in that same year. Id.
17 World Development Report, supra note 15, at 197. The United States ranks first, followed by West
Germany, Japan, the United Kingdom, France, and Italy. Id.
1s World Development Report, supra note 15, 203.
On a trade-weighted basis, three percent of the industrial market economies' merchandise trade exports
were destined for East European nonmarket economies in 1984, a total of nearly $60 billion worth oftrade. World
Development Report, supra note 15, 199, 203.
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accession. To bar its entry into the 92-member GATT would undermine whatever
aspirations GATT has for universality. In the words of ProfessorJohnJackson, "there
is more to be gained by full and universal participation in the international discussions
of economic affairs than there is by the exclusion of certain states. 20
This article examines the issue of Soviet accession to GATT. After an overview
of the nonmarket economic and trade system, the article discusses GATT principles in
the context of the accession of nonmarket-economy (NME) countries to GATT. The
article then describes the experiences of Poland, Hungary and Romania in the GATT
accession process. 21 It thereafter briefly discusses the Soviet economy and broadly
identifies areas of reform needed for Soviet accession to GATT. The article concludes
that unless the Soviet Union is prepared to decentralize its economy sufficiently to
allow market forces to have an effect on prices-a move that the Soviet Union
suggests it is prepared to make22-- full membership in GATT as a contracting party
cannot be realized.
I. CHARACTERISTICS or NMEs
To better understand the nonmarket economic and trading system, a brief
comparison with its Western counterpart is helpful. The industrialized West is in the
main comprised of countries with mixed market economies. Greatly simplified, in a
market economy international trade is driven by the independent decisions of buyers
and sellers acting out of economic self-interest. 23 Prices set by the market are used for
allocating scarce resources. These scarce resources are in turn channelled into their
most efficient uses by the market forces of supply and demand. 24 Consequently, prices
act as rationing and signalling mechanisms by which goods are traded consistently
with buyer preferences. 25
In nonmarket economies such as the Soviet Union, 26 by contrast, international
trade is regulated by state planning and control which set the prices and output of
2 Jackson, supra note 10, at 777.
21 But see Kostecki, supra note 13, at 14: "Soviet authorities refused participation in the GATT on the basis of
special arrangements such as were adopted for Poland and Romania."
22 3 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 1098 (1986).
23 See R. Carbaugh, International Economics 180 (1985) [hereinafter Carbaugh].
24 Carbaugh, supra note 23, at 180. See Carbon Steel Wire Rod from Poland; Final Negative Countervailing
Duty Determination, 49 Fed. Reg. 19,374, 19,375 (Dep't Comm. 1984) [hereinafter Carbon Steel Wire Rod from
Poland].
25 Carbaugh, supra note 23, at 180.
26 See Potassium Chloride from the Soviet Union; Rescission oflnitiation of Countervailing Duty Investiga-
tion and Dismissal of Petition, 49 Fed. Reg. 23,428 (Dep't Comm. 1984), where the International Trade
Administration of the Department of Commerce commented:
"in our opinion, the economy of a country is an NME whenever it operates on principles ofnonmarket cost
or pricing structures so that sales or offers for sale of merchandise in that country or to other countries do
not reflect the market value of the merchandise. We have found this to be the case in the Soviet Union
economy: prices are centrally administered; resource allocation is centrally directed; and the Soviet Union's
currency, the ruble, exhibits extremely limited convertibility. Therefore, we determine that the economy
of the Soviet Union is an NME."
49 Fed. Reg. 23, 249.
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goods, with scant consideration given to factors such as cost and efficiency. 27
Resources are not regulated by a market, but instead by central planning; the NME
government does not interfere with the market process, but instead replaces it. Of
course, a planning elite in a centrally controlled economy could not possibly make
every decision involved in the production and distribution of a nation's products. As
explained by one economist:
"The sentiment is often expressed that, for an economy of any complexity, completely
centralized decision making would exceed the capacity of any but an omniscient decision maker,
and that even one that had all the relevant information simply would not have the time to make
more than a relatively modest number of crucial decisions. Further, limits to information
gathering and processing exist that render such centralization infeasible. 
28
In order to reduce the informational requirements and the number of decisions to
be made by the central planners, the system is decentralized to some degree. Certain
decisions are delegated to the producing enterprises. Since decentralization can lead to
a loss of control by the central planners, it is accompanied by an incentive system
which is designed to channel accurate information back to the planners who in turn
can insure that the enterprises behave in a desired manner.29
Thus, rewards and bonuses are provided to induce desired behavior on the part of
managers and workers. Despite the use of terms such as "incentives" and "bonuses,"
an NME system cannot be equated with a market economy. As described by Lipsey
and Steiner, "The big difference [between market and NME economies] in incentive
systems is in whether those responsible for production respond to what is profitable to
produce or whether they respond to what they are directed to produce. 3 In short,
incentives in NME systems are control mechanisms.
In NME countries prices do not reflect relative scarcity3 nor are they related to
2 Carbaugh, supra note 23, at 180. See Bornstein, Economic Reform in Eastern Europe, reprinted in East
European Economies Post-Helsinki, A Compendium of Papers Submitted to the Joint Economic Committee,
95th Cong., 1st Sess. 102 (1977) [hereinafter Bornstein]. See generally Nonmarket Economy Imports Legislation
Hearing on S. 1351 Before the Subcomm. on Int'l Trade of the Senate Comm. on Finance, 98th Cong., 2d Sess.
(1984); Remedy for Artificial Pricing of Articles Produced by Nonmarket Economy Countries: Hearings on S.958 Before
the Subcomm. on Int'l Trade of the Senate Comm. on Finance, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. (1982). See also Holmer &
Bello, The Countervailing Duty Law's Applicability to Nonmarket Economies, 20 Int'l Law. 319 (1986); Horlick &
Shuman, Nonmarket Economy Trade and U.S. Antidumping/Countervailing Duty Laws, 18 Int'l Law. 807 (1984)
[hereinafter Horlick & Shuman].
28 Conn. A Comparison of Alternative Incentive Structures for Centrally Planned Economic Systems, 3J. Comp.
Econ. 261, 262 (1979).
29 See Bonin & Marcus; Information, Motivation, and Control in Decentralized Planning: The Case of Discretionary
Managerial Behavior, 3J.. Comp. Econ. 235 (1979), where the authors explain:
"[Aln omniscient planner could command his preferred solution using force as the motivating agent.
However, when no agent possesses sufficient information to both solve the economic problem at hand and
monitor compliance with the resulting directives, incentives must be carefully structured to promote
truthful reporting and motivate optimal performance."
Id. at 236.
30 R. Lipsey & P. Steiner, Economics 803 (1969) (emphasis in original).
31 See Berman & Bustin, The Soviet System of Foreign Trade, in Business Transactions with the USSR 55 (R.
Starr ed. 1975) ("Nor do internal prices adequately reflect the movement of supply and demand within the Soviet
Union") [hereinafter Berman & Bustin]. On the subject of prices in NMEs, the following anecdote was recently
reported in The Economist: " 'When the world revolution comes,' a Czech official was once heard to remark over a
cup of coffee, 'we shall have to preserve one capitalist country. Otherwise, we shall not know what prices to trade
at.' " The Economist, Comecon Survey, April 20, 1985, at 8, Col. 1.
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market forces.3 2 As the International Trade Administration of the Department of
Commerce explained in its Carbon Steel Wire Rodfrom Poland negative countervailing
duty determination: 33
"[W]e have found generally for NMEs... that prices are administered and that these prices
do not have the same meaning as prices in a market economy. Not only are the NME enterprise's
output prices controlled, but its costs, which are the prices paid for inputs, also are centrally
determined. With administered costs and prices, profits are effectively administered as well.
Finally, economic activity is centrally directed through the use of administered prices, plans and
targets. "3
In NME countries productive resources are allocated in accordance with the
central plan, with incentives encouraging compliance with the plan. Profit does not
have the same meaning in an NME country as it does in a market economy, given that
NME enterprises are not profit-maximizing. Instead, through central planning and
the incentive structure, NME enterprises carry out the central planners' directives.
Nonmarket economies are also characterized by their inconvertible currencies. 35
The basic rationale for currency incontrovertibility is that convertibility would
disrupt central planning. 36 If rubles could be converted into dollars, and vice versa,
free purchasing of goods across national borders would in theory be facilitated, 37
upsetting the central plan under which production and distribution of goods is
carefully controlled. 38 The upshot of the inconvertibility of Eastern currencies, in
tandem with central economic planning, has been the East's chronic balance-of-pay-
ments problem.3 9 In order to purchase Western goods, Eastern bloc countries have to
use Western "hard" currencies. But because of the poor quality of Eastern manu-
factured goods-attributed to the lack of competition and the emphasis on quantity
over quality of production in the East4 --- the demand for those products in the West is
3- See Tam, On Incentive Structures ofa Socialist Economy, 3J. Comp. Econ. 277 (1979), where the author notes
in this connection:
"In a socialist economy it is often the case that commodities are produced by a few large-scale enterprises,
and that the planner sets prices for these products. Controlled prices, however, lead to, among other things
defects, inferior product quality and lack of incentives for innovation by managers."
1,d.
33 49 Fed. Reg. 19,374 (1984).
34 Id. at 19,377.
35 See J. Spero, The Politics of International Economic Relations 360-61 (1985) [hereinafter Spero].
16 Id. at 360.
37 Id.
38 Id. But even if currency convertibility existed, the distribution of goods in the East is still tightly controlled.
This control is buttressed by the allocation of scarce resources to the production process, a restriction referred to as
commodity inconvertibility. Id.
39 Id. at 360-61.
10 Id. at 361. As observed in Goldman, Gorbachev and Economic Reform, 64 Foreign Aff. 56 (1985)
"Central planning in the Soviet Union penalizes rather than encourages innovation. Soviet industrial
ministers and factory managers have traditionally been rewarded for producing more, rather than
improved, products. Any manager who shuts down the production line in order to change models or
upgrade product quality risks a drop in production and thus a drop in his or her bonus. Seldom is any bonus
provided for better quality. Even when managers do innovate, they invariably find it impossible to obtain
the necessary capital funds for any innovation not anticipated well in advance."
Goldman, supra this note, at 60 [hereinafter Goldman]. Similar observations are made in Bialer & Afferica, The
Genesis of Gorbachev's World, 64 Foreign Aft. 605 (1985), where the authors comment that [t]he system of
centralized, direct planning stresses quantity over quality and lacks the flexibility necessary for innovation." Id. at
606 [hereinafter Bialer & Afferica].
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low, inhibiting the East's ability to earn sufficient foreign exchange to pay for its
purchases in the West.
Finally, centrally planned economies conduct foreign trade through state trading
organizations which have a trade monopoly over product groups. 41 This bureaucratic
shield hinders manufacturers' ability to respond to demands from foreign purchasers
for their products. 42 The East's foreign trade system has consequently been identified
as an additional barrier to East-West trade.43
Against this brief overview, we turn to a consideration of the experience of
NMEs vis-a-vis GATT accession.
II. NMEs AND GATT
In the early post-war period, the Eastern bloc governments maintained a
cautious distance from GATT and multilateral trade. 44 They feared that America
aspired to world political and economic domination, believed that trade protec-
tionism was necessary for their own industrialization, and insisted that principles of
non-discrimination in trade were inappropriate in a world of have and have-not
countries. 45 Furthermore, GATT was and still is designed for countries in which
market mechanisms operate, that is, where trade occurs on the basis of purely
economic considerations. 46 Against this backdrop, the dramatic reversal of attitude of
the East European governments with the announcement in 1955 that they now em-
braced principles of multilateralism and non-discrimination in world trade must have
come as a great shock to many Western observers. 47 As explained by one commentator:
"The centrally-planned economies now realized that an international trade order promot-
ing freer trade, non-discrimination and multilateralism would be in the interest of small and
middle-sized trading nations and that it was, indeed, these countries which derived the most
important economic advantages from participating in the system. "4
With an appreciation of the benefits to be gained from participating in a multi-
lateral trade organization based on a principle of non-discrimination, several Eastern
bloc countries began seeking GATT membership in the late 1950's. 49 In 1957, Poland
41 Id.
42 Id.
43 Spero, supra note 35, at 361.
44 Kostecki, supra note 13, at 2-4.
45 Id.
41 G. de Lacharriere, The Legal Framework for International Trade 16 (GATT Working Paper undated).
47 See Kostecki, supra note 13, at 5.
48 Kostecki, supra note 13, at 5 (footnote omitted). See also F. Roessler, The Scope, Limits and Function of the
GATT Legal System 12 (GATT Working Paper undated): "[T]he GATT does not prescribe any system of
ownership .... What is decisive for the GATT is whether the economy is centrally-planned or decentralized. Only
if the economic agents are autonomous competing entities do tariffs, quantitative restrictions, etc. play a role and
only then do the GATT commitments regarding these policy instruments become relevant."
9 Yugoslavia, which is not part of the Eastern bloc, acquired observer status in 1950, became an associate
member in 1959, and a full member in 1966. For a description of Yugoslavia's GATT accession experience, see
Kostecki, supra note 13, at 11, 25-27. Although Czechoslovakia is an original GATT member, at the time it
acceded to GATT it was not a state-controlled-economy country. For a description of Czechoslovakia's experi-
ence in GATT, see Kostecki, supra note 13, at 23-25. See also Reuland, GA TT and State- Trading Countries, 9 J.
World Trade L. 318 (1975).
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and Romania obtained observer status.5 0 Poland became an associate member in 1959
and a full member in 1967. 51 Romania became a full member in 1971.52 Hungary
became an observer in 1966 and a full member in 1973.13 While Bulgaria became an
observer in 1967,14 it has not made any further progress toward attaining full GATT
membership.
As evidenced by these dates, the process for obtaining full GATT membership
has been protracted for Eastern bloc countries, 5 although not without its rewards for
those countries which have become members. For example, in 1984, 28 per cent of
Hungary's merchandise exports went to industrial market countries.P For Poland
that figure was 34 per cent 7 and for Romania in 1983, 25 per cent.58
The legal framework chosen for dealing with centrally-planned-economy coun-
tries and their accession to GATT has been a country-by-country approach, with
GATT members negotiating arrangements with state-trading countries under the
auspices of GATT.5 9 As the following discussion explains, no uniform solution for
dealing with East European countries in GATT has been settled upon. 60 Four patterns
have emerged.
The case of Czechoslovakia and GATT is best described as suigeneris. Czechoslo-
vakia was already a full member of GATT at the time its economy became centrally
3 Kostecki, supra note 13, at 11. Full GATT membership takes place in a series of stages. As explained by
Professor John Jackson:
"Since the negotiation of the 'ticket of admission,' i.e., tariffconcessions by the acceding government, may
be a prolonged affair and since the acceding government may also need some time to adjust its international
trading practices to bring them into conformity with the obligations that it will undertake in GATT, the
practice has developed in GATT of new countries undertaking a series of'stages' of participation in GATT.
The first step may be no more than to obtain 'observer status' under Rule 8 or 9 ofthe Rules ofProcedure for
Sessions ofthe Contracting Parties. The next step may be... a declaration of'provisional accession' (not to
be confused with 'provisional application'), granting 'provisional accession', to the new participant for a
limited period of time . . . pending the completion of negotiations for full membership . .. [T]he
provisional participant has virtually all the benefits of membership as a true contracting party.
The last and final stage is the protocol for accession itself. .... Sometimes the protocol may have special
terms that will give the acceding government for which it is drafted the equivalent of a 'reservation.'
Jackson, supra note 10, at 94-95 (footnotes omitted).




55 The protracted process of Eastern bloc accession to GATT is attributable in part to the disproportionate
benefits nonmarket economy states receive under the most-favored-nation ("MFN") principle embodied in
GATT. As explained by Lansing and Rose, supra note 8:
"Greatly simplified, ... [blecause the government of an NME [nonmarket economy] states both collects
tariffs (from itself) and purchases all imports, the lower tariffs that MFN treatment generates produce no
greater incentive to import; the level of tariffs do not affect the price the government pays for imports...
Moreover, NME states generally effect their trade protection policies not through the tariff structures that
market economy states mainly employ but through quotas ... The upshot is that an exchange of MFN
treatment between NME and market economy states favors the NME state."
Id. at 340 (footnotes omitted).
56 World Development Report, supra note 15, 203.
57 Id.
58 Id.
'9 Kostecki, supra note 13, at 15.
Id. at 16.
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controlled. 61 Despite a rupture in trade relations with the United States as a con-
sequence of Czechoslovakia's entry into the Communist bloc, 62 no serious difficulties
arose within GATT from this event. Professor Jackson has suggested that "[o]ne of
the reasons that difficulties have been avoided, however, may be that other GATT
contracting parties did not feel that the amount of trade involved was consequential
enough to warrant an investigation of such problems as existed. " 63
The experience of Yugoslavia serves as the paradigmatic example of how a
Socialist state, given sufficient political will, can join GATT unconditionally. When
Yugoslavia first applied to GATT for observer status in 1950, it had a nonmarket
economy.64 Over the next nine years Yugoslavia took steps to decentralize its econ-
omy, culminating in associated member status in GATT in 1959.65 The protocol
between Yugoslavia and GATT establishing this special relationship accorded
Yugoslavia "such treatment as will achieve an equitable balance of rights and obliga-
tions as envisaged in the General Agreement. "66 In plain English, this meant trade
relations between Yugoslavia and GATT members would be conducted to the extent
possible given Yugoslavia's economic system. 67 While this special relation of associ-
ated membership was in part a reflection of reservations by GATT members about
Yugoslavia's centrally-planned economy, 68 it at the same time signalled optimism
that Yugoslavia could indeed move to a decentralized economy. 69 As events unfolded,
this optimism was not without foundation. During its three years as an associated
member, Yugoslavia decentralized its economy, introduced tariffs, abolished mul-
tiple exchange rates, and became multilateralist in its trade relations. 7 The introduc-
tion of meaningful tariffs was not without difficulty, however, owing in large
measure to price disparities between Yugoslavia and the rest of the world.7 Follow-
ing further decentralization of its economy, Yugoslavia obtained full GATT member-
ship in 1966 under the normal GATT obligations as exist among the other contracting
parties.V2
The experience of Yugoslavia with GATT is both reassuring and sobering. As
summarized by Professor Kostecki:
"First, this experience, especially in its earlier stage, provided the GATT countries with the
opportunity to acquaint themselves with difficulties that would arise in relations with target-
61 See Kostecki, supra note 13, at 23-25; Jackson, supra note 10, at 362.
62 Id.
63 Jackson, supra note 10, at 363.
64 Kostecki, supra note 13, at 25.
63 Id. at 11, 25.
" Declaration on Relations Between Contracting Parties to the GATT and the Government of the Federal
People's Republic of Yugoslavia, Agreement No. 60, App. C (1959).
617 Kostecki, supra note 13, at 25.
6 Jackson, supra note 10, at 363.
69 See Kostecki, supra note 13, at 25-26.
71 Kostecki, supra note 13, at 26.
71 Id.
72 Jackson, supra note 10, at 363.
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protected, state-trading systems. Secondly, Yugoslavia's participation in the GATT provided
empirical evidence that socialist economies could decentralize sufficiently to permit their mem-
bership of [sic] the GATT under the same conditions as Western market economies. Finally,
Yugoslavia's road to the GATT clearly demonstrated that substantial reforms are required to
shift from a target-protected, state-trading system to the GATT model of foreign trade and that,
even under political conditions extremely favourable to decentralization, years of adjustment are
necessary. "71
In contrast with the dramatic accommodations Yugoslavia made in its economy
to achieve GATT accession, Poland and Romania represent special cases of state-
trading countries obtaining GATT membership without adjusting their trading
systems. 74 Shortly after obtaining observer status in 1957, Poland abandoned its effort
to accede to GATT through the Yugoslav model of economic decentralization. 71 It
instead proposed accession on the basis of a global import commitment. 76 After a
number of false starts spanning a ten-year period,7 7 Poland finally became a full
GATT member in 1967. 78 With certain exceptions to the general prohibition on
quantitative restrictions, 79 the protocol for accession provides for full application of
the General Agreement to Poland, including the most-favored-nation clause.8 0 Har-
boring no illusions about the efficacy of tariff concessions in the context of a state-
trading economy,"l the GATT contracting parties and Poland agreed to a schedule
pegged to value of imports. Annex B to Poland's Protocol of Accession provides in
part that "Poland shall... undertake to increase the total value of its imports from the
territories of contracting parties by not less than 7 per cent per annum. "82 The formula
was premised on reciprocity: In exchange for Poland's import commitment, the
73 Kostecki, supra note 13, at 26-27.
71 See Kostecki, supra note 13, at 27.
73 Id.
76 Id. See Gadbaw, The Implications ofCountertrade Under the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, 5J. Comp.
Bus. & Cap. Market L. 355, 363 (1983), where the author notes that a 1946 International Trade Organization draft
would have required any country with a complete or substantial monopoly over imports to undertake a global
import commitment.
7 See Kostecki, supra note 13, at 28-29, where the author relates Poland's difficulties in arousing sufficient
interest in its membership, explained in part by the insignificance of Polish trade for GATT countries.
71 Jackson, supra note 10, at 363.
7, See Protocol for the Accession of Poland to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 18, 1967, 19
U.S.T. 4331, T.I.A.S. No. 6430, pt. 1, para. 3(a) [hereinafter Poland Protocol of Accession], which provides:
"Contracting parties which on the date of this Protocol apply to imports from Poland prohibitions or
quantitative restrictions which are inconsistent with Article XIII of the General Agreement may, notwith-
standing these provisions, continue to appply such prohibitions or restrictions to their imports from Poland
provided that the discriminatory element in these restrictions is (a) not increased and (b) progressively
relaxed as far as the quantities or values of permitted imports of Polish origin are concerned so that at the
expiry of the transitional period ... any inconsistency with the provisions of Article XIII has thus been
eliminated."
' Id., pt. 1, para. 1.
In its simplest form, in a state-controlled economy the state sets the prices for all domestically produced
goods, prices that may have little connection with costs, supply, and demand. The state thus has the power to
underprice its own goods relative to competing imports, thereby reducing or eliminating domestic demand for
such imports. Consequently, any tariffconcession on those imports is meaningless. In addition, after imports clear
customs, the price of those imports can be arbitrarily raised in a command economy. One motivation for such an
action would be to protect a competing domestic industry. The effect, of course, would be to once again lower or
eliminate the demand for those imported goods.
12 Poland Protocol of Accession, supra note 79, Annex B, para. 1.
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GATT contracting parties would make tariff concessions on imports from Poland.83
This commitment is subject to an annual review8 4 of the steps Poland has taken to..
ensure an increase in the total value of its imports from the territories of the con-
tracting parties.8 8 In the light of several defects in this formula-the absence of a nexus
between export and import performance and the failure to account for inflation when
calculating Poland's annual import performance 86 -- Poland's initial commitment was
replaced by a more flexible one that measured import performance by the same
average annual rate of increase, but calculated it over a longer period of time. 7 A
shortfall of imports in one year could be offset by superior import performance in
prior or succeeding years. 8
Following Poland's lead, Romania obtained GATT observer status in 1957.9 It
sat on the sidelines, however, until the negotiations with Poland were concluded,
expecting (and correctly so) that Poland would serve as an NME test case. 90 Romania
experienced many of the same problems that Poland weathered during its accession
negotiations, e.g., the problems of discriminatory quantitative restrictions, safe-
guards, and reciprocity.91 Since Romania suffered from balance-of-payments prob-
lems, it rejected any measure of import performance that was not tied to its export
performance with GATT contracting parties. 92 In addition, Romania viewed itself as
a developing country entitled to special concessions. 93 Consequently, in its protocol
of accession signed in 1971, 94 Romania stated that it 'firmly intends to increase its
imports from the contracting parties as a whole at a rate not smaller than the growth
of total Romanian imports provided for in its Five-Year Plan.95 Significantly, and
most obviously, unlike the Polish case where an import commitment was made,
Romania's undertaking does not refer to any specific rate of annual import increase. 96
83 Kostecki, supra note 13, at 94.
I" Polish Protocol of Accession, supra note 79, pt. 1, para. 5.
8s Id.,Annex A, para. (ii)(d).
' Kostecki, supra note 13, at 95. The first defect inured to the detriment of Poland which suffered chronic
balance-of-payment problems, while the latter had the effect oflimiting the effectiveness ofPolish concessions. Id.
8' GATT Basic Instruments and Selected Documents, 18th Supp., 201 (1972).
a See Kostecki, supra note 13,.at 95.
89 Kostecki, supra note 13, at 11.
I ld. at 30.
91 Id.
12 Kostecki, supra note 13, at 96.
93 Id.
91 1d. at 11.
15 GATT Basic Instruments and Selected Documents, 18th Supp., 10 (1972) (emphasis added). As noted by
Kostecki, "[tihe expression 'firmly intends' implies that it is much more a declaration ofRomania's intention than a
firm commitment as, for example, those included in the GATT schedule of concessions. In that respect the
Romanian arrangement is consistent with her claim to developing country status." Kostecki, supra note 13, at 96.
9 See Kostecki, supra note 13, at 97, where the author observes:
"The Romanian promise not to decrease the GATT share of imports in total Romanian imports, however,
could be considered the most important declaration of the Romanian party in the GATT. In commercial
terms it seems quite straightforward, but in political terms it testifies to Romania's scepticism concerning
the future of East European integration and expresses the desire to bolster economic independence
vis-a-vis the Soviet Union and the other non-GATT CMEA [Council for Mutual Economic Aid or
"COMECON"] countries."
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The latest NME country to join GATT is Hungary. Unlike the experiences of
Romania and Poland in GATT accession, and in imitation of the Yugoslav example in
that process, Hungary sought GATT membership on the basis of tariff concessions. 97
This proposal was initially received with scepticism from some GATT members who
noted that the effectiveness of Hungarian tariffs could be subverted by restrictions on
pricing and state monopolies. 98 After some wrangling over this issue, Hungary was
finally able to convince the sceptics that its tariffs were in fact its primary method of
trade protection. (This followed the decentralization of the Hungarian economy in
1968.99) With that understanding, Hungary became a full member of GATT in 1973
on the basis of tariff concessions but with a commitment to reduce its relatively high
tariffs. 100 Hungary made no commitment to increase imports from GATT members
at a fixed percentage or on the basis of past import performance. 101
In view of the experiences of Poland, Romania, Hungary, and Yugoslavia in the
GATT accession process, is there a place within GATT for the Soviet Union, given its
archetypical nonmarket economy? Unless the Soviets are prepared to make gradual
but nevertheless dramatic reforms in their economic system , the answer is certainly
"no". The next part of this article briefly examines and describes the Soviet economic
and trade system, and the economic reforms proposed by General Secretary
Gorbachev.
III. THE SOVIET ECONOMIC AND TRADE SYSTEM
The Soviet Union's State Planning Commission and Ministry of Foreign Trade
determines the level and composition of its foreign trade. 102 In the Soviet Union
foreign trade is a "state monopoly,"103 a distinctive phrase used only in connection
with Soviet foreign trade. to0 The most active of the agencies for conducting the Soviet
foreign trade monopoly are the Foreign Trade Organizations ("FTOs").t°5 A number
97 Id. at 97. See Kostecki, Hungary and GATT, 8J.W.T.L. (1974) p. 401.
98 Id.
91 Id. at 32.
100, Id. at 11, 97-98.
101 See GATT Basic Documents and Selected Instruments, 20th Supp., 37-41 (1974).
02 Carbaugh, supra note 23, at 180; Berman & Bustin, supra note 31, at 27-41, 54-55. See Bornstein, supra note
27, where the author notes:
"[Tihe quantities to be traded, and the prices involved, are usually determined not by the association or
enterprise itself but by the branch ministry and/or the ministry of foreign trade-particularly in regard to
trade with CMEA countries, which is arranged in high-level bilateral agreements covering quantities and
prices. Thus enterprises still receive foreign trade assignments, and their discretion is usually limited to
decisions on some aspects of the assortment, within the specified global total."
Bornstein, supra note 27, at 125. See also Georgetown Steel Corp. v. United States, No. 85-2805, slip op. (Fed.
Cir. Sept. 18, 1986) (countervailing duty law does not apply to NME countries as a matter of law).
"I Berman & Bustin, supra note 31, at 25.
104 Id.
055 For a discussion of Soviet FTOs, see Berman & Bustin, supra note 31, at 30-33; Rabinovitch, The Legal
Status of Soviet Foreign Trade Organizations in View of New Soviet Legislation, 15 Int'l Law. 233 (1981).
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of FTOs exist, defined in terms of product, service, or geographic market. 106 Soviet
producers and manufacturers may not conclude contracts with foreign firms without
going through the appropriate FTO.10 7 Each FTO is subject to central government
control. 108
Ideally, of course, Western businesses trading with the Soviet Union would
prefer the Soviets to trade on the basis of "commercial considerations only."1°9 This
desiderata seems beyond reach, however, because
"there is no way for the Soviet planners to divorce commercial considerations from other
considerations. The fact that more than two-thirds of Soviet foreign trade is conducted with
other socialist countries cannot be reconciled with the 'commercial considerations only'
formula, nor can the very low level of consumer goods. It is the very essence of a planned
economy that everything pertaining to commerce is, as Lenin put it, a matter of'public law'-
that commerce serves a public, and hence also a political, function. "1°
Despite the seemingly intractable nature of central planning"' and the inability of
economic reform to take root in the Soviet Union,"' General Secretary Mikhail
Gorbachev has spearheaded the introduction of far-reaching economic reforms in the
Soviet Union." 3 In tacit recognition of the inhibiting effect its FTOs have on foreign
trade, the Soviet Union announced in connection with its overture to GATT that
individual ministries and industries would be permitted to deal directly with foreign
buyers without the intervention of an FTO. 114 This reform will not mean the
abandonment of the state's monopoly over foreign trade, however." 5 Rather, it
represents only an erosion of that control." 6 Trade in raw materials and semi-
101 Berman & Bustin, supra note 31, at 31. In the Soviet Union there are approximately 70 FTOs responsible
for most of the Soviet Union's exporting and importing. T. Hoya, East-West Trade 12 (1984) [hereinafter Hoya].
117 Berman & Bustin supra note 31, at 66. In Hungary, large domestic manufacturers are being permitted to
sell directly to foreign customers without having to work through the FTOs. Hoya, supra note 106, at 12.
108 Hoya, supra note 106, at 11.
109 GATT, supra note 11, art. XVII(1)(b). The "commercial considerations only" criterion is that imposed by
GATT on the conduct of trade by state trading enterprises. See Berman & Bustin, supra note 31, at 65.
10 Berman & Bustin, supra note 31, at 65.
"I See Goldman, supra note 40, at 58, where the author notes that the inherently conservative nature of Soviet
planners inhibits significant economic reforms. Paradoxically, short-term economic gains serve to block long-run
structural change. "if things appear to be going well, why take the risk?" is the planner's attitude. Id.
112 For a review of the economic reforms initiated by Soviet leaders Khrushchev and Brezhnev, see Spero,
supra note 35, at 362-63. See also Goldman, supra note 40, at 57 ("Under Brezhnev, Soviet work habits had
deteriorated; alcoholism, corruption, inefficiency and disinterest made poor quality and increased output
inevitable. ").
113 See Brown, Change in the Soviet Union, 64 Foreign Aff. 1048 (1986) [hereinafter Brown]; Goldman, supra
note 40, at 56; Ploss, A New Soviet Era? 62 Foreign Pol'y 46 (Spring 1986).
"I4 See Soviet Union Increases Pressure to Win Role in New MTN Round, Pledging to Play by Rules, 3 Int'l Trade
Rep. (BNA) 1098 (1986). But see Bialer & Afferica, The Genesis of Gorbachev's World, 64 Foreign Aff. 605 (1986),
where the authors state that Gorbachev is on record as insisting that centralized administration and control was
necessary in foreign trade, particularly in the acquisition and disposition of advanced foreign technology. In a
situation where the hard-currency resources of socialist states are severely limited, decisions regarding what to buy
and how to distribute it must be highly centralized." Id. at 62 [hereinafter Bialer & Afferical.
15 See The Economist, Sept. 27, 1986, at 74, col. 2.
116 Id.
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manufactured goods, comprising the majority of the Soviet Union's exports, will
continue to be controlled by FTOs." 7
More basic internal economic reforms are needed if the Soviet Union is to have
any hope of meeting with success in its attempt to join GATT. Nothing short of
abandoning central planning is in order, 8 for the simple reason that central planning
penalizes innovation. In the words of Professor Marshall Goldman:
"[W]hat is important in the high-tech industrial world of today is not the centralized mobiliza-
tion and allocation of capital but flexibility and quick response time. In most societies, response
time is usuallly faster when there are decentralized sources ofcapital. A few bureaucrats sitting in
Moscow making ponderous committee decisions involving massive sums cannot deal with the
high risks involved and the rapid product turnover of the high-tech economy. That requires
many decision-makers with immediate access to varying quantities of capital." 9
Confronted with these realities, Soviet planners nevertheless staunchly cling to
central planning because it avoids the unpredictabilities of the market with its con-
comitant bouts with inflation and unemployment. 120 Gradually integrating a centrally
planned economy with a market model is like mixing oil and water.'12 Conversely,
comprehensive economic reform in the Soviet Union has been compared to assigning
a railroad engineer who has never flown before the task of flying a Boeing 747-not
impossible, but it has its risks. 22
In this connection, Professors Seweryn Bialer and Joan Afferica have concluded
that the principal characteristic of the Soviet system is the primacy of politics over
economics. 123 This primacy has four significant consequences for economic reform,
none of which advance such reform but which do entrench central planning. 124 They
explain:
117 d.
"I As one economist has observed with respect to Soviet incentive/reform programs introduced in 1979, the
expectation that such programs will cause NME enterprises to act like their market economy counterparts
"... is a grand illusion. Without any alteration in the economic environment, financial autonomy can
amount to no more than a change in accounting rules. To make it effective in inducing the desired behavior,
firms would have to be given broad freedom of action, alternative suppliers would have to be available,
prices would have to reflect relative scarcities and utilities reasonably well, and government bureaucracies
would have to retreat to overseeing the economy rather than directing it through detailed plans. None of
these systematic modifications forms any part of the latest reform package."
Schroeder, Soviet Economic "Reform" Decrees: More Steps on the Treadmill, reprinted in Soviet Economy in the
1980's: Problems and Prospects, Joint Economic Comm., 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 86 (1982) [hereinafter Schroeder].
In 1983, former Soviet leader Yuri Andropov introduced a series of economic reforms aimed at eradicating the
root causes of Soviet economic ills. Managers were to be given more autonomy and incentives were introduced to
increase productivity. Decentralization never occurred, however, because of bureaucratic intransigence. See
Washington Post, Jan. 20, 1985, at H8, col. 3.
IS Goldman, supra note 40, at 60.
"2 Id. at 61. Professor Goldman also challenges the assumption that the Soviet economy is free of inflation and
unemployment. Id.
121 Goldman gives the example of a reform introduced by Soviet leader Andropov under which a portion ofan
industry's profits could be placed in a special development fund. The rubles accumulated, but they had no value
since actual material resources were not allocated as well, thereby subverting the entire reform effort. Goldman,
supra note 40, at 64-65.
12 Goldman, supra note 40, at 65. Professor Goldman explains that delicate fiscal and monetary policies
would have to be implemented by officials with no prior experience in such matters. Id.
23 Bialer & Afferica, supra note 114, at 610.
124 Id.
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"First, economic growth is of crucial importance to the leadership and cannot be left to the
managers who directly administer the Soviet economy. Second, economic priorities are set in
accordance with the political priorities of the leadership and the elite. Third, the administration
of the economy and the implementation of economic plans is designed in a way that will not
impinge on the political power of the leadership and the elite. Fourth, while economic growth
and its attainment are a central preoccupation of the leadership and elite, economic factors and
considerations in themselves do not determine the formulation of these goals and the methods
by which they are to be attained."12s
Genuine economic reform in the Soviet Union for Professors Bialer and Afferica
means nothing less than the complete overhaul of a political economic system that has
existed for nearly six decades, 126 a daunting prospect indeed.
- IV. SOVIET ACCESSION TO GATT-PROSPECTS AND CONCLUSION
Recalling that GATT was created with market economies in mind, 127 at least two
words accurately describe GATT's approach in establishing trade relations with East
European governments: pragmatic and gradual. 128 Although GATT does contain a
specific article dealing with the somewhat anomalous situation of state-trading enter-
prises, 129 GATT does not envisage systematic and pervasive state control over trade.
State trading is to be the exception, not the rule. That GATT has been able to
accommodate the nonmarket economies of Poland and Romania is thus a testament to
its flexibility.
Despite th ese early successes, problems still persist. 10 From the perspective of
the East, their exports to the West have not grown sufficiently to finance their import
spending, resulting in severe balance-of-payments difficulties.' 3 From the perspec-
tive of the West, the Polish commitment and the Romanian undertaking based on
import performance are meaningless. 13 2 In recognition of these shortcomings, one
commentator has proposed that the protocols be amended to contain two new general
125 Id.
126 Id.
27 See, e.g., Patterson, supra note 1, at 186; Kostecki, supra note 13, at 135.
12_ See Note, East- West Trade; The Accession of Poland to the GA TT, 24 Stan. L. Rev. 748, 764 & n.94 (1972).
1 9 GATT, supra note 11, art. XVII. For a discussion of state-trading enterprises and GATT, seeJackson, supra
note 10, at 329-61; Kostecki, supra note 13, at 35-64; note 11, supra.
'1 See, e.g., Kostecki, supra note 13, at 134-46.
31 Kostecki, supra note 13, at 135. This is attributable in some measure to trade protectionism in the form of
discriminatory quantitative restrictions maintained by Western governments. Id.
132 Id. at 141. in the case of Poland, for example, its commitment is based on current prices which can be
eroded by inflation and increased by deflation. Patterson, supra note 1, at 188. Romania's "firm intention" to
increase imports is ultimately unenforceable. Patterson, supra note 1, at 189. See also F. Roessler, The Scope, Limits
and Function of the GATT Legal System 5-6 (GATT Working Paper undated), where the author states:
"It is doubtful whether the Polish import commitment ever had any practical impact. In the years
immediately following Poland's accession, the value of the dollar fell steeply. As a result, Poland could have
met the commitment to increase the value of its imports without increasing their volume. In recent years,
Poland, in a severe payments crisis, did not meet its import commitment .... "
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provisions. 133 The first is a guideline that GATT be applied to and by the NME
country to the extent compatible with its economic system. 134 The second guideline is
a commitment by the NME
"to use all the means available in its economic and foreign trade system in a manner which will
ensure that the cps [GATT contracting parties] receive benefits equivalent to those accruing to
the NME under the GATT, and not to use the means available in its economic system to nullify
and impair the benefits of the GATT.'
135
These guidelines are with a view to eventual graduation from an NME import
commitment to adoption of a customs tariff, as the NME becomes economically
decentralized and incorporates market-economy policies. 136 Such graduation would
permit elimination of the import commitment as a "ticket of admission" to GATT,
thereby greatly facilitating the application of the countervailing and antidumping
duty laws to NMEs, a problem that has been especially intractable and perplexing. 1
37
Moreover, in order for these guidelines to be meaningfully implemented, the ability
to verify compliance with GATT rules must exist. NME economic systems must
therefore become more transparent. 1
38
Juxtaposing these guidelines for successful and meaningful NME accession to
GATT with the preceding discussion on Soviet economic reform, the odds of the
Soviet Union successfully acceding to GATT are not good. Notwithstanding this
sobering and pessimistic assessment, the commitment of Gorbachev to economic
change should not be underestimated. Given his age (55) and the depth of his personal
commitment to this issue, 139 he is in a position not only to steer a course toward
economic reform but also to see thejourney to its end. Gorbachev is no Pollyanna; he
has readily acknowledged the time and energy such reform will take.' 40 Still, while
Gorbachev has recognized the irrationality of attempting to manage an economy the
133 Patterson, supra note 1, at 186.
134 Id.
135 Id. More concretely, Kostecki has proposed the state-trading economies adopt a tariff approach to trade.
Kostecki, supra note 13, at 141. In support of this proposal, Kostecki notes that GATT members have nothing to
lose and much to gain under such an approach; such a development would meet the West's aspiration of moving
the centrally-planned economies toward decentralization; and a tariff approach would be a step towards unifying
relations among members of GATT, an essentially tariff-oriented agreement. Id.
136 See Patterson, supra note 1, at 191.
137 See Patterson, supra note 1, at 198: "Many experts agree that of all the problems involved in NME
integration into the GATT-regulated trading system, few are as confounding as the application of the antidumping
and countervailing duty regulations [footnote omitted] .... A good part of the problem stems from inadequate
information and understanding of how the economic systems of the state-controlled economies operate. With
limited information it is difficult to determine if the concepts of dumping and subsidization are meaningful in
NMEs .... " See also Horlick & Shuman, supra note 27.
13. See Patterson, supra note 1, at 200, where the author notes that "Poland has willingly submitted infor-
mation on price formation in cases of alleged dumping; Hungary has submitted the information traditionally
required when balance of payments restrictions are imposed ...."
I3 See Brown, supra note 113, where the author concludes that "lilt is evident that Gorbachev is dedicated to
transforming Soviet economic performance. If minor reforms do not achieve that, my reading of his character is
that he possesses the self-confidence, pragmatism and political will to go further." Id. at 1060.
140 See Brown, supra note 113, at 1056. In addition, Gorbachev has noted both the overt and covert opposition
to economic reform within the Soviet bureaucracy. Id.
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size of the Soviet Union's centrally from Moscow,' optimism about future econ-
omic reform must be guarded at best in light of warnings from Gorbachev that the
Eastern bloc should not to be seduced by the "false glitter of market-oriented
reforms. "142 Gorbachev has, in fact, argued that centralization is not only necessary,
but that it may have to be strengthened. 143 Perhaps more importantly, Gorbachev's
proposed reforms may not be sufficiently radical;14 4 absent radical reform, proposals
like the ones advanced by Gorbachev "are like drugs administered to a body that has
already developed a tolerance for them; only a radically increased dose will produce
results. "145
Gorbachev has, of course, only recently assumed the Soviet helm. One wonders
how much of what Gorbachev says publicly about the conservative nature of econ-
omic reform in the Soviet Union is designed to counter bureaucratic resistance to such
reform. As he solidifies his position over the coming years, it is not inconceivable that
his proposals for economic reform may become bolder. Regardless of whether
Gorbachev is merely posturing in order to placate the bureaucrats, at all events, absent
decentralization, flexibility, transparency, and the introduction of market mecha-
nisms, the Soviet economic system cannot possibly begin to move in a liberal,
Western-and, presumably, a GATT-oriented-direction. 146
In order to avoid serious economic disruptions to the Soviet Union, could the
transition to a market economy be done gradually as in Hungary? 47 In the view of
some Soviet economists, Hungary is an inept model, given its far smaller (273 million
versus 11 million) and homogeneous population. 148 As for using the Polish or
Romanian experiences with GATT as possible accession models for the Soviet
Union, the Soviets have also rejected GATT accession on the basis of any such special
arrangements. 14 9 The Yugoslav model would seem to be totally out of the question, in
view of the very modest economic reform proposals advanced to date by the Soviet
authorities.
In short, the prospects for eventual Soviet accession to GATT seem dim. If the
Soviet economic system is to have any hope for eventually meshing with GATT
principles, and if the Soviet Union sincerely desires to participate fully in the GATT
141 Id.
142 Bialer & Afferica, supra note 114, at 612.
143 Id.
144 Id. at 615. Bialer & Afferica have identified seven reform measures undertaken or contemplated by the
Soviet leadership under Gorbachev: "wholesale change in managerial and administrative personnel and their
reeducation; increase in labor discipline; diminution of the number of indicators in central planning and greater
stress on quality and costs; technological progress; agricultural improvement; development of infrastructure;
education; and effective utilization of the Soviet strong point, centralized mobilization of resources for essential
goals." Id.
145 Id. at 616.
146 For an excellent critique of economic reforms proposed in the Soviet Union in 1979., see Schroeder, supra
note 118, at 82-86.
117 See Kostecki, Hungary and GA TT, 8J.W.T.L. (1984) p. 401 (1974).
144 See Goldman, supra note 40, at 63.
49 Kostecki, supra note 13, at 14.
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trade regime, decentralization is a minimum precondition. And while decentraliza-
tion is a necessary precondition, it is not a sufficient one. It must be coupled with the
introduction of market-oriented incentives (i.e., profits), in order to stimulate
improved product quality. The preliminary indications are that the Soviet Union is
not prepared to undertake these steps. Without them, Soviet accession to GATT will
remain little more than a distant hope.
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